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S
ince the turn of the twentieth century, states have 
brought their battles over shared surface waters to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Constitution grants the 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear disputes 
between the states—and the Court has concluded that this 
includes disputes over surface water. The many rivers and lakes 
that low across state boundaries have created a steady stream 
of interstate water cases over the past eleven decades.
Now, over a century after the Supreme Court established 
precedents for hearing and resolving interstate disputes over 
surface water, the Court faces its irst case of a dispute over 
interstate groundwater. One might expect the Court to sim-
ply use its established surface water doctrines and apply them 
to groundwater disputes. Indeed, the modern trend is to treat 
disputes over groundwater the same way that we treat disputes 
over surface water. But the Court seems to be entertaining the 
idea of treating water underground differently from that above 
it. The ight between Mississippi and Tennessee will not only 
impact the drinking water supply for residents of Memphis; 
how the Court ultimately resolves its irst interstate groundwa-
ter case will have tremendous implications for national water 
policy, state budgets, and the nature of property rights.
Before diving deeper, we must irst ask: What is “groundwa-
ter”? Groundwater is water found beneath the Earth’s surface 
within the saturated zone of a porous geologic formation 
known as an aquifer. In other words, groundwater is water that 
is stored not in aboveground formations (such as rivers and 
lakes) but instead rests beneath the Earth’s surface in aquifers.
How the Court addresses its irst groundwater case mat-
ters because groundwater matters. States have increasingly 
relied on groundwater to meet their growing water needs, so 
it was only a matter of time before interstate disputes over 
this resource reached the nation’s highest court. Notably, this 
increase is not driven by people consuming more water. States 
are iercely competing for water, but consumption rates have 
remained nearly lat for several decades. This is largely because 
of developing norms surrounding conservation and restoration 
of natural waterbodies. Legislatures, agencies, and other groups 
have consistently pushed to maintain and restore surface 
water in-stream lows, environmental protections, and eco-
system services. But groundwater is also sought after for other 
reasons. It is generally high quality and relatively unpolluted; 
widely available through drilling wells and pumping; and typi-
cally avoids the conlicts over navigation, recreational use, and 
habitat for isheries that challenge surface water uses.
So it is unsurprising that the country has increasingly relied 
on groundwater. Since 1950, groundwater withdrawals have 
more than doubled, from 34 billion gallons per day to 76 bil-
lion gallons per day (as of 2010). Groundwater now provides 
almost one-ifth of the freshwater used in the United States.
Until the rise of interstate disputes, groundwater use was 
almost exclusively a matter of state law. Western states gen-
erally use the prior appropriation doctrine (known as irst in 
time, irst in right) for groundwater, just as for surface waters. 
Eastern states most typically use some form of correlative rights 
for groundwater use (like riparian rights for surface waters), 
although some states have clung to the old rule of capture in 
varying forms. From west to east, the trend is for states to sup-
plement their common law doctrines with statutes regulating 
groundwater use by administrative bodies and agencies. And 
as groundwater science improves, states have turned their legal 
and policy attention to the surface water–groundwater connec-
tion and more integrated water management.
As states increasingly rely on groundwater to meet their 
freshwater demands, interstate conlicts have emerged across 
the country. This article discusses the two most prominent 
interstate groundwater disputes, one from the east and one 
from the west. The eastern case, Mississippi v. Tennessee, is the 
irst interstate groundwater case before the Supreme Court and 
will set important precedent for future litigation. The western 
case, a dispute between Utah and Nevada, provides a promis-
ing alternative to litigation—an interstate compact that could 
serve as a model for cooperative management and protection 
of shared interstate aquifers.
Mississippi v. Tennessee—the Supreme 
Court’s First Interstate Groundwater Case
In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted the 
State of Mississippi leave to ile a bill of complaint against the 
State of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and its utility Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Division for wrongfully converting 
groundwater from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer. Memphis is 
just north of the Mississippi border and relies heavily on this 
shared aquifer for its municipal water supply. Over a quar-
ter million Memphis residents rely solely on groundwater for 
drinking water, making Memphis second only to San Antonio, 
Texas, among the nation’s cities that depend solely on ground-
water for municipal water supply.
Groundwater withdrawals by Memphis from the shared 
aquifer have grown steadily and signiicantly for over a cen-
tury, paralleling the area’s population growth over the last few 
decades. Withdrawals now average over 187 million gallons 
per day. According to Mississippi, this means that Memphis 
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that could be equitably apportioned, explicitly drawing paral-
lels to the Court’s water law precedents.
Instead of pursuing an equitable apportionment claim 
against the state of Tennessee before the Supreme Court,  
Mississippi appealed the district court’s dismissal to the Fifth 
Circuit. Mississippi again argued that Tennessee was not an 
indispensable party because the suit did not involve Tennessee’s 
sovereign interests. Mississippi further argued against the equi-
table apportionment of the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer, claiming 
that it owned the groundwater resources within its sovereign 
territory.
The Fifth Circuit afirmed the district court and held that 
the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer was shared interstate water and 
must be equitably apportioned “before one state may sue an 
entity for invading its share.” Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City 
of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2009). The court 
rejected Mississippi’s argument that it owned a “ixed resource” 
interest in the aquifer water, stating that water “is not a ixed 
resource like a mineral seam, but instead migrates across state 
boundaries.” Id. at 630. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
The fact that this particular water source is located 
underground, as opposed to resting above ground . . . is 
of no analytical signiicance. The Aquifer lows, if slowly, 
under several states, and it is indistinguishable from a 
lake bordered by multiple states or from a river bordering 
several states depending upon it for water.
Id.
Mississippi then iled its irst petition for writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, based on the same arguments of absolute 
ownership of groundwater rejected by the lower courts. When 
the Court denied certiorari in 2010, Mississippi v. City of  
Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010), it seemed to tacitly approve 
the holdings of lower courts that interstate groundwater dis-
putes must be resolved by equitable apportionment.
But after several years of further study and attempts at a 
negotiated resolution, Mississippi came back to the Supreme 
has been pumping water at rates much higher than that of the 
aquifer’s natural recharge rate, resulting in permanent, harmful 
changes to a vital source of groundwater. Mississippi does not 
suffer from a water shortage itself, but argues that the pumping 
of groundwater has resulted in the wrongful conversion of its 
state property by Memphis.
Mississippi’s attorney general irst iled suit against Memphis 
on the claim of wrongful conversion of state property in 2007 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Mississippi. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis,  
533 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (N.D. Miss. 2008). The city of 
Memphis irst responded with a motion to join the state of 
Tennessee as a defendant party (which Mississippi opposed). 
The district court ruled that Tennessee was a necessary and 
indispensable party “because in its absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties to the action,” 
but the court did not have the jurisdiction to join the state. Id. 
at 649. The district court ultimately ruled that relief could not 
be granted until it was determined “which portion of the aqui-
fer’s water is the property of which State.” Id. at 648. The court 
cited the Supreme Court’s precedent of applying equitable 
apportionment for resolving interstate water disputes, con-
cluding that the Supreme Court would have to apportion the 
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer between the two states.
Equitable apportionment is the Supreme Court’s established 
common law doctrine for resolving interstate disputes over 
shared waters and other natural resources. Equitable apportion-
ment rests on two related rationales. The irst, explained by 
Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342–
43 (1931), is a practical one: water is a “necessity of life that 
must be rationed among those who have power over it,” and 
where two states “have real and substantial interests” in inter-
state water, those interests “must be reconciled as best they 
may be.” The second, derived from our constitutional scheme 
and international law, respects the states as sovereigns with 
“equality of right,” as described in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 
46, 97–98 (1907), when
the action of one state reaches, through the agency of 
natural laws, into the territory of another state, the ques-
tion of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the 
two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between 
them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute 
in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both 
and at the same time establish justice between them.
Equitable apportionment is a lexible doctrine and highly 
fact-dependent, looking at natural conditions, human needs 
and uses, effects and harms, and the states’ relative beneits 
and damages. While it was developed and has been used most 
commonly for surface waters, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered groundwater issues within the equitable apportionment of 
groundwater-connected surface water. In Kansas v. Colorado, 
206 U.S. 46, 114–15 (1907) and Washington v. Oregon, 297 
U.S. 517, 524–26 (1936), the Supreme Court recognized that 
groundwater connected to a river should be treated as part of 
the low of the river in an interstate equitable apportionment 
case. Further, in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 
1024 (1983), the Court held that interstate runs of anadro-
mous ish, such as salmon and steelhead trout, were a resource 
The fight between Mississippi 
and Tennessee will not only 
impact the drinking water 
supply for Memphis; how 
the Court resolves its first 
interstate groundwater case 
will have implications for 
national water policy, state 
budgets, and property rights. 
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solicitor general and defendants have argued.
Alternatively, the Court could fashion a rule for interstate 
groundwater disputes out of its interstate nuisance doctrine. 
Interstate nuisance has the beneit of allowing the Supreme 
Court to consider the beneits and harms of different uses of a 
shared interstate resource and then determine which uses are 
reasonable—without the full technical and legal process of 
quantifying and then apportioning the interstate aquifer. Inter-
state nuisance is most commonly used for pollution. But as 
demonstrated in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), it 
can be used to restrict one state’s water use to levels that min-
imize harm to neighboring states, while taking into account 
both the need for municipal water use and the importance of 
conserving freshwater resources. So the doctrine could be used 
here as well.
The Snake Valley Agreement—Utah and 
Nevada Craft a Model for Interstate 
Cooperation
Although conlicts over shared interstate groundwater are 
inevitable, lawsuits are not. Cooperative agreements, formal-
ized as interstate compacts, offer an attractive alternative 
to litigation. The Snake Valley Aquifer straddles the Utah-
Nevada border and is a classic example of shared interstate 
groundwater. The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute between Utah 
and Nevada is a telling case study and resulted in a cooperative 
agreement for groundwater protection and management—the 
proposed Agreement for Management of the Snake Valley 
Groundwater System, available at www.greatlakeslaw.org/iles/
Final_NV_UT_Snake_Valley_Agreement.pdf. Although the 
states have yet to adopt the negotiated agreement, it could 
serve as a model for other states who want to avoid the strife of 
protracted litigation.
The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute is not simply a ight 
between two states, but rather a complex dispute between a 
growing distant city, local agriculture, and environmental pro-
tection. The limited water in this desert region has historically 
been used for local agriculture, with the groundwater support-
ing a small community of residents and farmers on both sides 
of the Utah-Nevada border. While local water use for domes-
tic supply and agriculture has remained fairly constant, climate 
change has led to a loss of winter snowpack. This is important 
because the snowpack feeds the aquifer, and thus future water 
supplies will likely shrink. The fragile local balance between 
water supply and demand is further threatened by Las Vegas 
(300 miles away), which needs water for its growing urban 
population. On top of all of this, environmental interests want 
to limit total water withdrawals to protect groundwater-depen-
dent ecosystem functions and environmental services, most 
notably vegetation that prevents erosion and dust storms.
Since at least 1989, Nevada and Las Vegas have looked 
to the Snake Valley Aquifer to meet growing water demand. 
Opposing Las Vegas are local interests on both sides of the 
Utah-Nevada border. It’s tempting to demonize Las Vegas as a 
water-hungry sin city, with a booming population and iconic 
images of luxurious water fountains surrounded by arid desert, 
but the truth is more complex. Las Vegas has developed some 
of the nation’s most progressive and effective water conserva-
tion policies, resulting in a decline in per capita water usage. 
Despite these conservation measures, Las Vegas and Nevada 
face long-term water management challenges, including a 
Court for another try in June of 2014. This time it sought 
leave to ile a bill of complaint before the Court against the 
state of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and its utility  
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division. Mississippi again 
argued that it has sovereign ownership of the water being 
drawn from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer and that Tennessee’s 
pumping is tantamount to wrongful conversion. Mississippi did 
not even seek equitable apportionment as an alternative to its 
novel wrongful conversion claim. Rather, it requested relief in 
the form of “a declaratory judgment establishing Mississippi’s 
sovereign right, title and exclusive interest in the groundwa-
ter stored naturally in the Sparta Sand formation underlying 
Mississippi,” along with $615 million in damages. Bill of Com-
plaint, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 220143 (2014).
Despite opposition from the U.S. solicitor general, the 
weight of authority from analogous cases, and unanimous rul-
ings from lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Mississippi 
leave to ile its bill of complaint on June 29, 2015. The Supreme 
Court’s grant of leave opens the door to three potential out-
comes and precedents for deciding interstate groundwater cases. 
First, the Court could accept Mississippi’s position that it has a 
sovereign ownership of water in the aquifer, and that Tennes-
see is converting this water regardless of whether this water was 
apportioned. This argument would bring back to life the state 
ownership theory that was explicitly rejected by the Supreme 
Court in a line of cases culminating in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 
458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, the Court “traced the demise 
of the public ownership theory and deinitively recast it as ‘but 
a iction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its 
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the 
exploitation of an important resource.’” 458 U.S. at 951.
Bringing the state ownership theory back to life would 
reverse decades of precedent and signal a radical change in our 
natural resources and water law jurisprudence—and it would 
signiicantly undermine progress in national policy making. 
This approach also would ineficiently deplete state budgets: 
using interstate resources will now come with a price tag for 
wrongful conversion. Given both precedent and national 
policy concerns, the Court should instead apply its equita-
ble apportionment doctrine to groundwater, as both the U.S. 
The dispute over the Snake 
Valley Aquifer, which straddles 
the Utah-Nevada border, is 
not simply a fight between 
two states, but rather a 
complex dispute between a 
growing distant city in a desert 
region, local agriculture, and 
environmental protection.
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all party states and approval by Congress (with presentment 
to the president). Once effective, compacts have the full force 
and supremacy of federal law, and state commitments can be 
enforced in federal court.
Nearly 30 interstate compacts manage shared surface waters 
in the United States, including the Great Lakes, the Colorado 
River, the Rio Grande, the Arkansas River, the Susquehanna 
River, and the Delaware River. A few of these interstate com-
pacts address groundwater resources that are hydrologically 
connected to the subject surface-water system. But before the 
proposed Snake Valley Agreement, no interstate compact had 
focused primarily on shared interstate groundwater.
The Snake Valley Agreement began with a premise “to 
work cooperatively to . . . resolve present or future controver-
sies” over the shared groundwater, “assure the quantity and 
quality of the Available Groundwater Supply,” “minimize the 
injury to Existing Permitted Users,” “minimize environmen-
tal impacts,” “maximize the water available for Beneicial Use 
in each State,” and “manage the hydrologic basin as a whole.” 
While “[t]he Agreement does not grant any water rights,” it 
“allocates the Snake Valley groundwater resources between 
the two States, and provides for the joint management of the 
aquifer.” This preserves the regulatory authority and decision 
making of the states for groundwater withdrawals within their 
respective borders.
Not all good policy deeds get rewarded politically. After the 
release of the Snake Valley Agreement, Utahns rallied against 
it. Much of the opposition was based on mistrust and rivalry 
with Las Vegas, rather than concerns with the terms of the 
agreement itself. Because of public opposition, Utah Gover-
nor Gary Herbert delayed signing the document for four years, 
and in 2013, ultimately announced that he would not sign 
the Snake Valley Agreement. He explained that “[a] majority 
of local residents do not support the agreement with Nevada. 
Therefore, I cannot in good conscience sign the agreement 
because I won’t impose a solution on those most impacted 
that they themselves cannot support” and “[t]here is no more 
complex and emotional issue with which I have grappled as 
governor of this great state.” Press Release, Ofice of the Utah 
Governor, Governor Will Not Sign Snake Valley Water Agree-
ment (Apr. 3, 2013), available at www.utah.gov/governor/
news_media/article.html?article=8675.
The political demise of the Snake Valley Agreement may 
prove only temporary, as potential litigation often causes par-
ties to rethink previously rejected settlement agreements. 
However, regardless of its political fate, the Snake Valley 
Agreement should be used as a model for states with conlicts 
over shared groundwater resources. But ultimately, the moti-
vation for entering into cooperative agreements is linked to 
the outcome of the Mississippi v. Tennessee case. If the Supreme 
Court sides with Mississippi and adopts the state ownership 
theory for groundwater, states may not be motivated to coop-
erate to manage interstate groundwater. Instead, they might 
choose to invest in determining their respective property and 
assessing damages for wrongful conversion. Hopefully the 
Court recognizes the shared interstate nature of groundwater 
and applies equitable apportionment or interstate nuisance. 
This way, states will see the beneits of proactive and coop-
erative management over litigation when it comes to this 
critically important natural resource.  
relatively small share of Colorado River water and the impacts 
of climate change on snowpack and resulting water supplies.
When the Las Vegas Valley Water District (later succeeded 
by the Southern Nevada Water Authority as the utility supply-
ing Las Vegas) began making applications for groundwater in 
the Snake Valley, local residents and ranchers were alarmed. 
Legal challenges were iled and protests made. While these ights 
continue, Nevada has simultaneously pursued building a 300-
mile pipeline to deliver the distant aquifer water to Las Vegas.
The pipeline route would cross federal land, another poten-
tial source of opposition. But Las Vegas has good friends in 
the United States Senate. In 2004, Nevada’s Senators Harry 
Reid and John Ensign inserted a clause into the Lincoln 
County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 301(e)(3), 118 Stat. 2413, 2414 
(2004), directing the federal Bureau of Land Management to 
release land for the pipeline. However, Utah was already con-
cerned about conlicts over the shared interstate groundwater, 
and Utah’s Senator Bob Bennett inserted a clause requiring an 
interstate agreement before pumping from any shared basins:
Prior to any transbasin diversion from ground-water 
basins located within both the State of Nevada and the 
State of Utah, the State of Nevada and the State of 
Utah shall reach an agreement regarding the division 
of water resources of those interstate ground-water low 
system(s) from which water will be diverted and used by 
the project. The agreement shall allow for the maximum 
sustainable beneicial use of the water resources and pro-
tect existing water rights.
Id.
The 2004 act further required that a federal study be con-
ducted of the Snake Valley Aquifer and surrounding region. 
The study was delivered to Congress in December 2007. The 
study ultimately determined that some excess water lowed out 
of the Snake Valley Aquifer, setting the stage for negotiations 
over this resource.
During and after the study, Nevada and Utah entered 
into nonpublic negotiations to apportion the water, eventu-
ally reaching a proposed agreement four years later. Under the 
terms of the proposed Snake Valley Agreement, unappropri-
ated excess water would be split roughly evenly between the 
two states. Further, the states would implement an extensive 
environmental protection and water management scheme with 
provisions for ongoing data collection, monitoring, and dispute 
resolution. In retrospect, negotiating the terms of the coopera-
tive agreement was easy, or at least rational. It was the political 
process of signing the agreement into law, which would typi-
cally be done as an interstate compact, which proved to be the 
real challenge.
A compact can be understood as a contract between states, 
subject to federal approval. Article I, Section 10, of the U.S. 
Constitution provides the authority and process for interstate 
compacts, requiring congressional approval. As happened with 
the proposed Snake Valley Agreement, interstate compacts are 
typically negotiated by governors and other state agency ofi-
cials. Enactment then requires both the legislative approval of 
